Whereas other democracies such as those of the US, the UK and Israel have been confronting merely terrorist act of one or two sorts, India has been confronting terrorist act of multiple beginning with varied aims and different countries of operation. Our intelligence bureaus and security forces have been confronting cross-border terrorist act and backwoods terrorist act ; urban jihadi terrorist act and rural Maoist terrorist act ; ideological terrorist act, spiritual terrorist act and cultural or breakaway terrorist act ; autochthonal jihadi and pan-Islamic jihadi terrorist act ; and autochthonal and Pakistan and Bangladesh sponsored terrorist act. The likeliness of nautical terrorist act and WMD menaces from Al Qaeda based in Pakistan ‘s tribal belt and cyber terrorist act from IT-literate terrorists have added to the complexness of the scenario.
Common Core Principles of Counter Terrorism Strategy
2. Against this background, India ‘s counter-terrorism scheme has to hold a common nucleus with rules applicable to all terrorist act and separate faculties bespoke and suited to the different sorts of terrorist act that we have been confronting. The rules of this common nucleus, some of which are in force even now, are:
( a ) The Police would be the arm of first resort in covering with hinterland terrorist act of all sorts and the ground forces would be the arm of merely last resort.
( B ) In covering with cross-border terrorist act in J & A ; K and with the ULFA and the tribal insurrectionists in the North-East, the Army would hold the leading function, with the constabulary operating in the interior countries and the Army operating nearer the boundary lines. The para-military forces would be available for aid to the Police every bit good as the Army.
( degree Celsius ) Intelligence aggregation against backwoods terrorist act would be the joint duty of the Intelligence Bureau ( IB ) and the State Police and in the boundary line States of the IB, the Police and the Military intelligence. Intelligence aggregation sing the external branchings of all terrorist administrations would be the duty of the R & A ; AW.
( vitamin D ) The new mutants of terrorist act, which could strike India one twenty-four hours, such as WMD, maritime and cyber terrorist act have to be dealt with jointly by the Armed Forces, the scientific community and the constabulary, with the ground forces holding the leading function in regard of WMD terrorist act, the Navy/Coast Guard in regard of nautical terrorist act and an appropriate S & A ; T administration in regard of cyber terrorist act.
( vitamin E ) While we should follow a no-holds barricaded attack to oppress terrorists from Pakistan and Bangladesh operating in our district, our scheme in regard of our ain subjects who have taken to terrorism should be nuanced with a mix of the political and security strands.
( degree Fahrenheit ) While we should avoid the booby traps of over-militarisation or Americanization of our counter-terrorism scheme, which would be counter-productive in our state with the 2nd largest Muslim population in the universe and with our location in the thick of the Islamic universe, we should non waver to follow with suited alterations the best counter-terrorism patterns from the US, the UK and Israel. Among patterns worthy of emulation one could advert authorising the constabulary with particular Torahs, the creative activity of a cardinal bureau for coordinated probe and prosecution of terrorist act instances, rigorous in-migration control, strong action to halt illegal in-migration and to throw out illegal immigrants, action to halt the flow of financess to the terrorists from any beginnings, both internal and external, and the acceptance of the construct of an incorporate counter-terrorism staff for an incorporate analysis of all terrorism-related intelligence and joint action on them. All bureaus holding counter-terrorism duties should be represented in the staff.
3. Constructing a National Strategy. The development of our counter-terrorism scheme in India has been in tantrums and starts every bit and when it faced a new sort of terrorist act or faced a crisis state of affairs. Similarly, the counter-terrorism community excessively has grown up in a haphazard mode. The attack to terrorist act has been more tactical than strategic, more influenced by short-run thought than long-run projections. There is a demand to put up a dedicated undertaking force to urge a comprehensive counter-terrorism scheme. The scheme has to be community-based to pull the support of all communities, political consensus-based to pull the support of all political parties and should supply for a close interaction with the private sector to profit from its expertness and capablenesss and to actuate it to protect itself in soft countries.
4. Re-Structuring of MHA. Another of import measure should be the reorganization of the Ministry of Home Affairs ( MHA ) .A Counter-terrorism is one of its many duties. While the tendency in other states has been towards holding a individual Ministry or Department to cover entirely with counter-terrorism, MHA has resisted this trend.A In any incorporate bid and control for counter-terrorism, the Ministry responsible for counter-terrorism has to play a polar function. The importance of holding a individual leader for covering entirely with internal security, without being burdened with other duties was realised by Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao. Alternatively of bifurcating the MHA, Rajiv Gandhi created a station of Minister of State For Internal Security in the MHA to manage all operational affairs including engaging a joint run against terrorist act by the Centre and the States. This continued under Narasimha Rao. The clip has come to make an independent Ministry of Internal Security. A
5. Intelligence Reforms. Insufficiencies in our intelligence bureaus have remained unidentified and unaddressed. Every successful terrorist work stoppage speaks of an intelligence failure. There is a deficiency of co-ordination non merely among the bureaus at the Centre, but besides between the cardinal bureaus and those of the province constabulary. The issues of how to better the measure and the quality of the intelligence flow, to guarantee better co-ordination at the Centre and with the States etc have to be desperately addressed by a dedicated undertaking force on terrorism-related intelligence capabilities.A
6. Menace Analysis. Strategic menace analysis has undergone a important alteration since 9/11. Before 9/11, analysis and appraisal of menace perceptual experiences were based on existent intelligence or information available with the intelligence and security bureaus. 9/11 has brought place to policy-makers the troubles faced by intelligence bureaus, nevertheless well-funded they might be, in perforating terrorist administrations to happen out inside informations of their thought and planning. This realization brings place the importance of analysts functioning policy-makers invariably placing national security exposures, which might pull the attending of terrorists, and proposing options and actions to deny chances for onslaughts to the terrorists. Vulnerability analysis has become every bit of import as menace analysis.A Furthermore, strategic analysts can no longer restrict themselves to an analysis and appraisal of strategic developments of a conventional nature originating from State histrions, but should pay equal attending to the strategic impact of non-State histrions, such as international or trans-national terrorists, offense Mafia groups and atomic proliferators on planetary security in general and our ain national security in particular..
7. Coordinated Police Action. We have succeeded where the terrorist act or insurgence was a regional phenomenon and was confined to a narrow country. We have non succeeded where the menace was pan-Indian in nature with the web widening its presence to many States in the North and the South.A A pan-Indian menace requires a coordinated pan-Indian response at the political and professional degrees. The inclination of the intelligence bureaus and the constabulary of different States to maintain each other in the dark about what they know and non to acknowledge to each other as to what they do non cognize comes in the manner of a pan-Indian professional response.A There has been a overplus of studies and recommendations on the demand for better sharing and co-ordination, but without any consequence on our bureaus and the constabulary.
8. Addressing the Muslim Alienation and Political Involvement. An effectual political handling has to get down with a elaborate analysis of the causes of choler and action to cover with them. Our immature Muslims, who are taking to jihadi terrorist act, are non bothered by issues such as deficiency of instruction and unemployment, reserve for Muslims etc. They are angry at what they consider to be the unfairness to the Muslims, which, harmonizing to them, is widely prevailing in India. Unsatisfactory political handling of the Muslim young person by all political parties is an worsening cause of the menace from jihadi terrorist act. Flow of human intelligence about jihadi terrorist act is weak because of the post-9/11 phenomenon of planetary Islamic solidarity and the adversarial relationship between the bureaus and the constabulary on the one side and the Muslim community on the other. Feelingss of Islamic solidarity prevent even observant Moslems from volunteering to the bureaus and the constabulary information about their co-religionists, who have taken to terrorist act and from helping the constabulary in their probe. The adversarial relationship has resulted in common demonization. How to come out of this syndrome is a affair for serious consideration non merely by the constabulary and the bureaus, but besides by the political category and the civil society, including the media.A
9. Political Ambivalence. Unfortunately, the multiplicity of political parties, the epoch of alliance and the inclination in our state to over-politicise terrorist act come in the manner of a pan-Indian political response. The bureaus and the Police are mostly responsible for the absence of a coordinated professional response, but the political leading at the Centre and in different States can non get away their portion of duty. The attitude of our political category to terrorist act is ambivalent. On the one manus, it is worried, justly, over this turning menace. On the other, it continues to see this as a vote-catcher. Every political party has been firm in demanding action against terrorist act when it is out of power. It becomes soft when it comes to power. That is the curse of our counter-terrorism. Merely voter force per unit area can coerce the political category to halt working terrorist act as an electoral arm and to get down covering with it as a major menace to national security, which should unify the political category and the civil society. A determined political leader, who has the national involvements in head, can utilize a whip and do the bureaus and the constabulary co-operate. A political leader whose policies and actions are motivated by zealots and non national involvements will come in the manner of professional co-operation.
10. Disincentive. Finally, the jihadi terrorist act in our district has been able to boom because of the support from the intelligence bureaus of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Our anxiousness for improved dealingss with them has been coming in the manner of any disincentive to their continued usage of terrorist act against India.A The disincentive has to be in the signifier of an effectual covert action capableness, which we should be prepared to utilize against the terrorist substructure in Pakistani and Bangladeshi district, if left with no other option. The covert action capableness, which was reportedly wound up in 1997 out of a misplaced sense of generousness to Pakistan, has to be revived.