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Essay, Research Paper

Role of The Emperor in Meiji Japan

Japan is a society whose civilization is steeped in the traditions

and symbols of the yesteryear: Mt. Fuji, the tea ceremonial, and the sacred

objects of nature revered in Shintoism. Two of the most of import

traditions and symbols in Japan ; the Emperor and Confucianism have

endured through Shogunates, Restorations of imperial regulation, and up to

present twenty-four hours. The leaders of the Meiji Restoration used these

traditions to derive control over Japan and further their ends of

modernisation. The Meiji leaders used the symbolism of the Emperor to

add legitimacy to their authorities, by claiming that they were governing

under the & # 8220 ; Imperial Will. & # 8221 ; They besides used Confucianism to keep

order and coerce the Nipponese people to passively accept their regulation.

Nipponese swayers historically have used the symbolism of the

Imperial Institution to warrant their regulation. The symbolism of the

Nipponese Emperor is really powerful and is wrapped up in a mix of

faith ( Shintoism ) and myths. Harmonizing to Shintoism the current

Emperor is the direct descendant of the Sun Goddess who formed the

islands of Japan out of the Ocean in antediluvian times.Footnote1 Harmonizing

to these myths the Nipponese Emperor unlike a King is a life

descendant of the Gods and even today he is thought of as the High

Priest of Shinto. Despite the powerful myths environing Japan & # 8217 ; s

imperial establishment the Emperor has enjoyed merely figure caput position

from 1176 on. At some points during this clip the Emperor was reduced

to selling penmanship on the streets of Kyoto to back up the imperial

family, but normally the Emperor received money based on the

kindness of the Shogunate.Footnote2 But despite this obvious power

instability even the Tokugawa Shogun was at least symbolically below the

Emperor in position and he claimed to govern so he could transport out the

Imperial rule.Footnote3

Within this historical context the Meiji leaders realized

that they needed to tackle the construct of the Imperial Will in

order to regulate efficaciously. In the old ages taking up to 1868 members

of the Satsuma and Choshu kins were portion of the imperialist

resistance. This resistance claimed that the lone manner that Japan could

last the invasion of the aliens was to beat up around the

Emperor.Footnote4 The Imperialists, claimed that the Tokugawa

Shogunate had lost its imperial authorization to transport out the Imperial Will

because it had capitulated to Western powers by leting them to open

up Japan to merchandise. During this clip the thoughts of the imperialists

gained increasing support among Nipponese citizens and intellectuals

who taught at freshly established schools and wrote revisionist history

books that claimed that historically the Emperor had been the

swayer of Japan.Footnote5 The fact that the Tokugawa & # 8217 ; s policy of

opening up Japan to the western universe ran counter to the beliefs of

the Emperor and was unpopular with the populace made the Tokugawa

vulnerable to assail from the imperialists. The imperialists pressed

their onslaught both militarily and from within the Court of Kyoto. The

great military government of Edo which until late had been wholly

powerful was staggering non because of military failing, or because

the machinery of authorities had broken but alternatively because the

Nipponese public and the Shoguns protagonists felt they had lost the

Imperial Will.Footnote6

The terminal of the Tokugawa government shows the power of the

symbolism and myths environing the imperial establishment. The

caput of the Tokugawa kin died in 1867 and was replaced by the boy of

a Godhead who was a title-holder of Nipponese historical surveies and who

agreed with the imperialists claims about reconstructing the Emperor.

Footnote7 So in 1868 the new shogun handed over all his power to the

Emperor in Kyoto. Shortly after passing over power to the Emperor, the

Emperor Komeo died and was replaced by his boy who became the Meiji

Emperor.Footnote8 Because the Meiji Emperor was merely 15 all the power

of the new restored Emperor fell non in his custodies but alternatively in the

custodies of his close advisers. These advisors such as Prince

Saionji, Prince Konroe, and members of the Satsuma and Choshu kins

who had been members of the imperialist motion finally wound up

affecting into the Meiji Bureaucracy and Genro of the Meiji

Era.Footnote9 Once in control of the authorities the Meiji Leaders and

advisers to the Emperor reversed their policy of ill will to

Foreigners.Footnote10 They did this because after Emperor Komeo ( who

was strongly opposed to reach with the West ) died in 1867 the Meiji

Emperor & # 8217 ; s advisers were no longer bound by his Imperial Will. Bing

anti-western besides no longer served the intents of the Meiji advisers.

Originally it was a tool of the imperialist motion that was used to

show that the Shogun was non moving out the Imperial Will. Now that

the Shogun and Komeo Emperor were dead there was no longer a ground to

take on anti-foreign policies.

The pick of the imperial thrown by the imperialists as a

point for Japan to beat up around could non hold been more wise.

Although the imperial establishment had no existent power it had cosmopolitan

entreaty to the Nipponese public. It was both a mythic and spiritual thought

in their minds.Footnote11 It provided the Japanese in this clip of

pandemonium after coming in contact with aliens a belief in stableness

( harmonizing to Nipponese myth the imperial line is a unbroken line of descent

handed down since clip immortal ) , and it provided a belief in the

natural high quality of Nipponese culture.Footnote12 The symbolism of

the Emperor helped guarantee the success of the restorationists because

it undercut the legitimacy of the Shogunate & # 8217 ; s regulation, and it

strengthened the Meiji swayers who claimed to move for the Emperor.

What is a great paradox about the Imperialist & # 8217 ; s claims to

reconstruct the power of the Emperor is that the Meiji swayers did non

reconstruct the Emperor to power except symbolically because he was both

excessively immature and his advisers to power hungry.Footnote13 By 1869 the

relationship between the Emperor and his Meiji bureaucratism and the

Emperor and the Tokugawa Shogun before the Restoration were really

similar. Both the Meiji Bureaucrats and the Shogun ruled under the

authorization of the Emperor but did non allow the Emperor make any

determinations. In Japan the Emperor reigned but did non govern. This

was utile for the new Meiji administrative officials, it kept the Emperor a mythic

and powerful symbol.Footnote14

The traditions and symbols of Confucianism and the Imperial

Institution were already profoundly ingrained in the mind of

the Nipponese but the new Meiji swayers through both an instruction

system, and the construction of the Nipponese authorities were able to

efficaciously instill these traditions into a new coevals of

Nipponese. The instruction system the Meiji Oligarchy founded transformed

itself into a system that indoctrinated pupils in the thoughts of

Confucianism and fear for the Emperor.Footnote15 After the decease

of Okubo in 1878 ; Ito, Okuma, and Iwakura emerged as the three most

powerful figures among the immature administrative officials that were running the

authorities in the name of the Meiji Emperor. Iwakura one of the lone

figures in the ancient aristocracy to derive prominence among the Meiji

oligarchy allied with Ito who feared Okuma & # 8217 ; s progressive thoughts would

destroy Japan & # 8217 ; s culture.Footnote16 Iwakura it is thought was able

pull strings the immature Emperor to turn concerned about the demand to

strengthen traditional ethical motives. Therefore in 1882 the Emperor issued the

Yogaku Koyo, the precursor of the Imperial Rescript on

Education.Footnote17 This papers put the accent of the Nipponese

instruction system on a moral instruction from 1882 onward.

Previous to 1880 the Japanese instruction system was modeled on

that of the Gallic instruction system. After 1880 the Nipponese briefly

modeled their instruction system on the American system.Footnote18

However, get downing with the Yogaku Koyo in 1882 and stoping with the

1885 reorganisation of the section of Education along Prussian

lines the American theoretical account was abolished. The new instruction curate

Mori Arinori after returning from Europe in 1885 with Ito was

convinced that the Japanese instruction system had to hold a religious

foundation to it.Footnote19 In Prussia Arinori saw that foundation to

be Christianity and he decreed that in Japan the Education system was

to be based on fear for the Imperial Institution. A image of

the Emperor was placed in every schoolroom, kids read about the

myths environing the Emperor in school, and they learned that the

Emperor was the caput of the elephantine household of Japan.Footnote20 By the

clip the Imperial Rescript on Education was decreed by the Emperor in

1889 the Japanese instruction system had already begun to transform

itself into a system that did non learn how to believe but alternatively what

to believe. The Imperial Rescript on Education in 1889 was harmonizing to

Nipponese bookmans such as Hugh Borton, & # 8220 ; the nervus axis of the new

order. & # 8221 ; Footnote21 Burton believes that the Imperial Rescript on

Education signaled the rise of chauvinistic elements in Japan. The

Imperial Rescript on Education was the apogee of this whole

motion to the right. The Rescript emphasized trueness and filial

piousness, regard for the fundamental law and preparedness to function the

authorities. It besides exalted the Emperor as the contemporary between Eden

and earth.Footnote22

The Constitution of 1889 like the alterations in the instruction

system helped beef up fear for the Imperial Institution.

The 1889 fundamental law was truly the 2nd papers of its sort

passed in Japan the first being the Imperial Oath of 1868 in which the

Emperor laid out the construction and who was to head the new Meiji

government.Footnote23 This Imperial Oath was refereed to as a

fundamental law at the clip but it merely really mistily laid out the

construction of authorities. The fundamental law promulgated by the Emperor

in 1889 did much more so put out the construction of Nipponese

authorities it besides affirmed that the Emperor was the supreme crowned head

over Japan.Footnote24 The sign language ceremonial itself was an auspicious

event on the manner to it Mori Arinori one of the moderate leaders of the

Meiji authorities was attacked and killed by a deranged right-winger.

Footnote25 The ceremonial itself evoked both the yesteryear and nowadays and

was symbolic of the Meiji authoritiess switch toward the right and the

authoritiess usage of the Emperor as supreme swayer. Before subscribing the

papers Emperor Meiji prayed at the castle sanctuary to continue the

name of his imperial ascendants he so signed the fundamental law which

affirmed the holiness of the Emperor & # 8217 ; s rubric ( Tenno Taiken ) , and his

right to do or abrogate any law.Footnote26 The fundamental law besides set

up a bicameral legislature.Footnote27 The fundamental law codified the

power of the Emperor and helped the Meiji oligarchy warrant their regulation

because they could indicate to the fundamental law and say that they were

transporting out the will of the Emperor. The Meiji Emperor even after the

Fundamental law of 1889 enjoyed small existent power. The Meiji Emperor did

non even come to cabinet meetings because his advisers told him if the

cabinet made a determination that was different so the 1 he wanted so

that would make discord and would destruct the thought of the

Imperial Institution. So even after the Meiji Constitution the Emperor

was still preponderantly a symbol.Footnote28 The Constitution ingrained

in Nipponese society the thought that the authorities was being run by

higher forces who new better so the Nipponese people, it besides

broadened the base of support of the Meiji Rulers who now had a

papers excessively prove they were moving on Imperial Will and their

determinations were imperial determinations non those of mere mortals.Footnote29

The symbolism of the Emperor and usage of Confucianism allowed

the Meiji swayers to accomplish their ends. One of their ends was the

abolition of the system of feoffs and return of all land to the

Emperor. At foremost the new Meiji Rulers allied themselves with the

Daimyo kins in resistance to the Tokugawa Shogun. But one time the Meiji

leaders had gained a control they saw that they would necessitate to get rid of

the feoff system and dressed ore power in the custodies of a cardinal

authorities. The Meiji swayers achieved their ends by holding the

Choshu, Satsuma, Tosa, and Hizen kins give up their lands, allowing

the Daimyos big pensions if they gave up their kins, and by holding

the Emperor issue two edicts in July 1869, and August 1871.Footnote30

The function and symbolism of the Emperor although non the exclusive factor in

act uponing the Daimyo to give up their feoffs, was critical. The Meiji

Oligarchs said that non turning in the feoff to the Emperor would be

disloyal and pointed to the historical record which Meiji bookmans

claimed showed that historically all feoffs were the belongings of the

Emperor.Footnote31 They showed this by claiming that the Shogun would

exchange the swayers of feoffs and this proved that the Daimyos did non

command the rubric to their land but simply held it for the Emperor.

Imperial edicts and mottos of trueness to the Emperor besides

accompanied the abolition of the Samurai system.Footnote32 In the

abolition of both these feudal systems the symbolism of the Emperor

as both the manager of the enterprise and receiver of the authorization

afterwards played a critical function in guaranting there success.Footnote33

The abolition of feoffs and the samurai category were indispensable

for the stableness and industrialisation of Japan.Footnote34 Without

the concentration of land and power in the custodies of the Meiji

oligarchs and the Emperor the Meiji oligarchs feared they would

receive resistance from powerful Daimyos and ne’er derive control and

authorization over all of Japan. Historical illustrations bear out the frights of

the Meiji Oligarchy ; in 1467 the Ashikaga Shogun failed to command

many of the feoffs and because of this a civil war raged in

Japan.Footnote35 The centralisation of power allowed the Meiji

authorities to hold taxing authorization over all of Japan and prosecute

national projects.Footnote36 The integrity of Japan besides allowed the Meiji

Oligarchs to concentrate on national and non local issues.

The usage of Confucianism and the Emperor besides brought a grade

of stableness to Jap

an during the disruptive Meiji old ages. The Emperor’s

mere presence on a train or in western apparels were plenty to convert

the populace of the safety or goodness of the Meiji oligarchy & # 8217 ; s

industrial policy. In one celebrated case the Nipponese Emperor

appeared in a train auto and after that siting trains became a common

topographic point activity in Japan. The behaviour of the Imperial household was besides

critical to acceptance of western cultural patterns. Before 1873 most

Nipponese adult females of a high societal place would shave their superciliums

and melanize their dentitions to look beautiful. But on March 3rd 1873 the

Empress appeared in public have oning her ain superciliums and with

unblackened dentitions. Following that twenty-four hours most adult females in Tokyo and around

Japan stopped shaving their superciliums and melanizing their

teeth.Footnote37 The Imperial establishment provided both a cardinal tool to

alteration Nipponese civilization and feelings about industrialisation and it

provided stableness to Japan which was critical to leting

industrialists to put in mills and increase exports and

production.Footnote38

The symbols and the traditions the Meiji leaders inculcated

Nipponese society with helped the Meiji authorities maintain stableness

and prosecute its economic policies but it besides had terrible restrictions

that limited the radical range of the Nipponese authorities and

helped convey about the ruin of the Meiji epoch. The usage of

Confucianism and the Emperor to bolster the Imperial Restoration laid

the foundation for a paradox of province personal businesss. The system that sought

to beef up Japan through the usage of modern engineering and modern

organisation methods was utilizing traditional values to foster its

goals.Footnote39 This caused some to turn toward the West for the

& # 8220 ; enlightenment & # 8221 ; the Meiji epoch promised this was the instance with Okuma

who was finally forced out of the increasing patriot

Genro.Footnote40 For others it lead them to severe patriotism

rejecting all that was western. This was such the instance of Saigo who

believed till his decease on his ain blade that the Meiji leaders were

hypocritical and were go againsting the Imperial Will by negociating and

trading with the west.Footnote41 The Meiji authorities used the same

symbols and traditions that the Tokugawa used and like the Tokugawa

gave the Emperor no determination doing power. The Meiji Emperor although

he had supreme power as accorded in the fundamental law ne’er really

made determinations but was alternatively a pawn of the Meiji Genro who claimed

to transport out his Imperial Will. This Imperial Will they decided for

themselves. Like the Shogunate the Meiji authoritiess claim to govern for

the Emperor was fraught with jobs. The Imperial Will was a fluid

thought that could be adopted by different parties under altering

fortunes. And merely like the Meiji swayers were able to tumble the

Shogun by claiming successfully that they were the true decision makers

of the Imperial Will ; the warmonger elements in the 1930 & # 8217 ; s were able

to tumble the democratic elements of Japan partly by claiming the

mantle of governing for the Emperor.Footnote42 From this position the

Meiji Oligarchs constructing up of the Imperial Myth was a fatal defect in

the authorities. The fundamental law which says in article I, & # 8220 ; The imperium

of Japan shall be governed over by a line of Emperors unbroken for

ages eternal & # 8221 ; gave to whoever was moving on the Imperial Will absolute

right to govern.Footnote43

The symbols of the Emperor and the tradition of Confucianism

did non stop with the terminal of the Meiji epoch or universe war two. Today the

thought of filial piousness is still strong, multiple coevalss of a household

still normally live together even in cramped Nipponese lodging. The

faith of Shinto that the Meiji leaders rejuvenated during their

regulation in order to assist further the imperial cult is still booming as

the 1000s of Tori Gatess and Shrines around Japan attest.Footnote44

But the most dramatic symbol to last is that of the Emperor

stripped after universe war two of all power the Emperor of Japan is

still revered. During the unwellness of Emperor Showa in 1989 every

national newspaper and telecasting show was full of studies related to

the Emperor & # 8217 ; s wellness. During the six months the Showa Emperor was ill

before he died all parades and public events were canceled in regard

for the Emperor. Outside the Gatess of the Imperial castle in Tokyo

long tabular arraies were set up where people lined up to subscribe cards to wish

the Emperor a rapid recovery. The intelligence media even kept the type of

unwellness the emperor had a secret in respect to the Emperor. At his

decease after months of unwellness it was as if the Imperial Cult of the

Meiji epoch had returned. Everything in Japan closed down, private

telecasting Stationss went every bit far as to non aerate any commercials on the

twenty-four hours of his decease. And now about six old ages after his decease more so

four hundred and 50 thousand people trek yearly to the stray

sedate site of Emperor Showa.Footnote45

The traditions and symbolism of Confucianism and the Emperor

were critical to the Meiji oligarchs deriving control of power and

ends of industrialisation. The oligarchy inculcated the Nipponese

public with these traditional values through an instruction system that

stressed moral acquisition, and through a fundamental law that established

the jurisprudence of Japan to be that of the Imperial Will. The values of

Confucianism and symbol of the Emperor allowed the Meiji authorities to

peaceable addition control of Japan by appealing to history and the

Restoration of the Emperor. But the Meiji oligarchs ne’er reconstruct the

Emperor to a place of existent political power. Alternatively he was used as

a tool by the oligarchs to accomplish their modernisation programs in Japan

such as the abolition of feoffs, the terminal of the samurai, the

extension of new cultural patterns, and pubic credence of the

Meiji oligarchs industrialization policies. The symbols and traditions

of Japan & # 8217 ; s yesteryear are an digesting bequest that have manifested themselves

in the Meiji Restoration and today in Japans continued fear for

the Emperor.

& # 8212 ;

Footnote1

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 47.

Footnote2

Takatsu Kuwasaburo, The History of The Empire of Japan ( Tokyo: Dai

Nippon Tosho Kabushiki Kwaisha, 1893 ) 206.

Footnote3

Ibid. , 17.

Footnote4

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present ( Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,

1987 ) 112.

Footnote5

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )

32.

Footnote6

Shusuke Sato, Some Historical Phases of Modern Japan ( New York: Japan

Society, 1916 ) 4.

Footnote7

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )

44.

Footnote8

Louis Allen, Japan the Years of Triumph ( London: Purnell and Sons,

1971 ) 8.

Footnote9

David Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan ( New York: Columbia

University Press, 1974 ) 55

Footnote10

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976 ) 73.

Footnote11

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 142.

Footnote12

Ibid. , 35.

Footnote13

Stephen Large, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London:

Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989 ) 27.

Footnote14

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )

70.

Footnote15

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976 ) 116.

Footnote16

Ernest Best, Christian Faith and Cultural Crisis the Nipponese Case

( Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966 ) 108.

Footnote17

Ibid. , 105.

Footnote18

Ibid. , 106.

Footnote19

Ibid. , 106.

Footnote20

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976 ) 117.

Footnote21

Hugh Borton, Japan & # 8217 ; s Modern Century ( New York: Ronald Press, 1955 )

524.

Footnote22

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976 ) 118.

Footnote23

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )

69.

Footnote24

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 60.

Footnote25

Ian Nish, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London: Suntory-Toyota

International Centre, 1989 ) 9.

Footnote26

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )

193.

Footnote27

Ibid. , 192.

Footnote28

Stephen Large, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London:

Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989 ) 27.

Footnote29

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 89.

Footnote30

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )

77.

Footnote31

Ibid. , 78.

Footnote32

Ibid. , 77.

Footnote33

Ibid. , 83.

Footnote34

Ibid. , 82.

Footnote35

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present ( Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,

1987 ) 66.

Footnote36

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976 ) 117.

Footnote37

Louis Allen, Japan the Years of Triumph ( London: Purnell and Sons,

1971 ) 41.

Footnote38

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976 ) 84.

Footnote39

Ibid. , 119.

Footnote40

Ibid. , 88.

Footnote41

Ibid. , 94-95.

Footnote42

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present ( Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,

1987 ) 166.

Footnote43

Ibid. , 167.

Footnote44

Ibid. , 13.

Footnote45

Stephen Large, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London:

Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989 ) 20.

Bibliography

Footnote1

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 47.

Footnote2

Takatsu Kuwasaburo, The History of The Empire of Japan ( Tokyo: Dai

Nippon Tosho Kabushiki Kwaisha, 1893 ) 206.

Footnote3

Ibid. , 17.

Footnote4

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present ( Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,

1987 ) 112.

Footnote5

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )

32.

Footnote6

Shusuke Sato, Some Historical Phases of Modern Japan ( New York: Japan

Society, 1916 ) 4.

Footnote7

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )

44.

Footnote8

Louis Allen, Japan the Years of Triumph ( London: Purnell and Sons,

1971 ) 8.

Footnote9

David Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan ( New York: Columbia

University Press, 1974 ) 55

Footnote10

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976 ) 73.

Footnote11

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 142.

Footnote12

Ibid. , 35.

Footnote13

Stephen Large, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London:

Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989 ) 27.

Footnote14

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )

70.

Footnote15

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976 ) 116.

Footnote16

Ernest Best, Christian Faith and Cultural Crisis the Nipponese Case

( Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966 ) 108.

Footnote17

Ibid. , 105.

Footnote18

Ibid. , 106.

Footnote19

Ibid. , 106.

Footnote20

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976 ) 117.

Footnote21

Hugh Borton, Japan & # 8217 ; s Modern Century ( New York: Ronald Press, 1955 )

524.

Footnote22

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976 ) 118.

Footnote23

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )

69.

Footnote24

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 60.

Footnote25

Ian Nish, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London: Suntory-Toyota

International Centre, 1989 ) 9.

Footnote26

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )

193.

Footnote27

Ibid. , 192.

Footnote28

Stephen Large, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London:

Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989 ) 27.

Footnote29

Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan

( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 89.

Footnote30

Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era

1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )

77.

Footnote31

Ibid. , 78.

Footnote32

Ibid. , 77.

Footnote33

Ibid. , 83.

Footnote34

Ibid. , 82.

Footnote35

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present ( Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,

1987 ) 66.

Footnote36

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976 ) 117.

Footnote37

Louis Allen, Japan the Years of Triumph ( London: Purnell and Sons,

1971 ) 41.

Footnote38

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1976 ) 84.

Footnote39

Ibid. , 119.

Footnote40

Ibid. , 88.

Footnote41

Ibid. , 94-95.

Footnote42

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present ( Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,

1987 ) 166.

Footnote43

Ibid. , 167.

Footnote44

Ibid. , 13.

Footnote45

Stephen Large, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London:

Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989 ) 20.

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